ENTITY Documentation
VERSION BOUNDARY ENTITY v3.4.3 is the current supported runtime. This page intentionally preserves the independent qualification program tied to the exact frozen v3.4.2 release. BTDU remains component version 3.4.2 unchanged.
Historical frozen target · ENTITY v3.4.2

Independent qualification calls

These gates remain bound to immutable v3.4.2 evidence so outside assessors can evaluate one exact release without the target moving. They are not statements that v3.4.2 remains the current deployment release.

Independent failures, limitations and negative findings are useful evidence.

Frozen qualification target: v3.4.2 · commit 6dfa3d6cc738d9369cf092d2782676bf4f2a46e4 · tree f90bf74e29899f82d0a4ee321604346241bba4de. Qualification evidence may accumulate after release; the immutable target is not rewritten.

Frozen v3.4.2 gates

Hardware-backed sovereign key custody

Qualify TPM 2.0, PIV/YubiKey, HSM, Secure Enclave or equivalent non-exportable key custody with restart and fail-closed evidence.

Qualification #58 →

Physical multi-host qualification

Run the frozen release on physically separate hosts, exchange and verify signed ENTITY material bidirectionally, then exercise restart/recovery and a negative case.

Qualification #59 →

Certified-device pilot

Execute a representative ENTITY workflow on hardware with independently documented certification or validation such as FIPS or Common Criteria.

Pilot #60 →

Independent security audit

Audit the frozen v3.4.2 release, document scope/methodology/findings, use responsible disclosure for sensitive issues, and hash the final report.

Security audit RFP #61 →

Independent assessor receipt

Review the complete frozen evidence package, validate provenance/hashes, classify gates without waiving missing evidence, and issue a signed/hash-bound assessment receipt.

Assessment #62 →

Common evidence controls

Why these calls remain public

GitHub provides timestamped discussion history, attributable participants, linked repositories/commits, CI evidence and a public chain of review. The objective is not to create the appearance of validation; it is to recruit unrelated parties who can produce evidence BTG cannot legitimately self-issue against the exact frozen target.